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 STATE INCOME TAX AMNESTIES: CAUSES*
 JEFFREY A. DUBIN
 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ
 Louis L. WILDE
 This paper analyzes empirically for the years 1980-1988 the factors that led
 states with state income taxes to run tax amnesty programs. We find that the
 potential yield from an amnesty is more important than the fiscal status of a state.
 Furthermore, we estimate that if the IRS audit rate had remained constant during
 the 1980-1988 period (instead of falling by almost one half), then the cumulative
 probability that an average state would have had a tax amnesty by 1988 would have
 fallen by just over 25 percent.
 I. INTRODUCTION
 Between December 1981 and March 31, 1990, 28 states with
 state income taxes offered some form of tax amnesty program that
 included income taxes.' Two states (Illinois and Louisiana) have
 each conducted two tax amnesty programs. The dates for state tax
 amnesty programs that have included income taxes,2 their gross
 revenues, and coverage characteristics are shown in Table I.
 Gross revenues from state tax amnesty programs have ranged
 from lows of $150,000 and $280,000 for North Dakota and
 Louisiana, respectively, to highs of $182 million and $401 million
 for New Jersey and New York, respectively. All of the programs
 included nonfilers but varied with respect to whether taxpayers
 with delinquent accounts or taxpayers who filed returns but
 underreported their taxes were eligible. The earliest five state tax
 amnesty programs covered nonfilers only.
 Despite the fact that 28 of the 40 states with nontrivial state
 income taxes have now run tax amnesty programs, the efficacy of
 *Michael J. Graetz thanks the National Science Foundation for research
 support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Jeffrey A. Dubin and Louis L. Wilde (grant no.
 SES-8701027). We thank Mike McDonald and Mike Udell for research assistance.
 This paper is a revised version of Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde [1989]. Graetz is
 currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) of the Treasury. This
 research was conducted before Graetz assumed that office and does not necessarily
 reflect the views of the Treasury Department. We also acknowledge the comments
 of seminar participants at the University of California at Los Angeles, Claremont
 College, McMaster University, and the NBER Summer Institute as well as those of
 an anonymous referee, and two members of the board of editors.
 1. Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming
 have no state income tax. Connecticut taxes only interest, dividends, and capital
 gains, while Tennessee and New Hampshire tax only interest and dividends.
 2. Texas and Florida also have run tax amnesty programs, but these states do
 not have income taxes.
 c 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
 Technology.
 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1992
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 TABLE I
 HISTORY OF STATE TAx AMNESTIES, REVENUES, AND COVERAGE
 Coverage
 Gross
 Time revenue Non- Accounts Under-
 State period ($ millions) filers receivablea reportersb
 Illinois (# 1) 12-28-81 to 0.089 yes no no
 1-08-82
 Arizona 11-22-82 to 6.0 yes no no
 1-20-83
 Idaho 5-20-83 to 0.3 yes no no
 8-30-83
 Missouri 9-1-83 to 0.9 yes no no
 10-31-83
 North Dakota 9-01-83 to 0.2 yes no yesc
 11-30-83
 Massachusetts 10-17-83 to 86.5 yes yes yes
 1-17-84
 Alabama 1-20-84 to 3.1 yes no yes
 4-1-84
 Kansas 7-01-84 to 0.6 yes no no
 9-30-84
 Oklahoma 7-01-84 to 13.9 yes yes yes
 12-31-84
 Minnesota 8-01-84 to 11.7 yes yes no
 10-31-84
 Illinois (# 2) 10-1-84 to 160.5 yes yes yes
 11-30-84
 California 12-10-84 to 198.0 yes yes yes
 3-15-85
 New Mexico 8-15-85 to 13.7 yes no yesd
 11-13-85
 South Carolina 9-1-85 to 7.5 yes yes yes
 11-30-85
 Wisconsin 9-15-85 to 26.8 yes yes yes
 11-22-85
 Colorado 9-16-85 to 6.4 yes no yes
 11-15-85
 Louisiana (# 1) 10-1-85 to 1.2 yes no no
 12-31-85
 New York 11-01-85 to 401.3 yes yes yes
 1-31-86
 Michigan 5-12-86 to 109.8 yes yes yes
 6-30-86
 Mississippi 9-1-86 to 1.0 yes no yes
 11-30-86
 Iowa 9-02-86 to 35.1 yes yes yes
 10-31-86
 West Virginia 10-01-86 to 15.9 yes yes yes
 12-31-86
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 01 Sep 2017 22:20:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms





 Time revenue Non- Accounts Under-
 State period ($ millions) filers receivablea reportersb
 Rhode Island 10-15-86 to 0.7 yes no no
 1-12-86
 Arkansas 9-01-87 to 1.7 yes no yes
 11-30-87
 Maryland 9-01-87 to 34.5 yes yes yes
 11-02-87
 New Jersey 9-10-87 to 186.5 yes yes yes
 12-08-87
 Louisiana (# 2) 10-01-87 to 1.2 yes no no
 12-15-87
 Kentucky 9-15-88 to 61.1 yes no yes
 12-15-88
 North Carolina 9-1-89 37.6 yes yes yes
 12-01-89
 Virginia 02-01-90 32.2 yes yes yes
 03-31-90
 a. Amnesty waives penalties for payment of delinquent accounts.
 b. Amnesty includes individuals who filed returns but underreported their tax liability.
 c. The North Dakota tax amnesty was only open to persons not "under investigation." In principle,
 underreports were included, but only nonfilers participated.
 d. Approximately 95 percent of gross revenue from the New Mexico tax amnesty came from nonfilers.
 Source: Federation of Tax Administrators.
 such programs remains uncertain. Controversy also surrounds
 proposals for a federal income tax amnesty [Leonard and Zeck-
 hauser, 1987]. One reason for these controversies is that almost no
 systematic empirical work has been done on the factors that have
 caused states to run tax amnesty programs, the reasons why
 taxpayers participate in them, and the future effects of the
 programs on the number of returns filed and on total revenue
 collected. Some evidence does exist on those aspects of state tax
 amnesty programs that tend to affect gross amnesty revenues. Alm
 and Beck's [1986] analysis of amnesties for the calendar years
 1982-1985 identifies two features as important: the participation
 of known delinquents, i.e., the inclusion of accounts receivable, and
 the coupling of increased enforcement efforts with the amnesty
 program.
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically for calendar
 and fiscal years 1980-1988 the factors that led states with state
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 income taxes to run tax amnesty programs.3 We find a principal
 factor to be the level of IRS auditing; in particular, we find that
 states have tended to "free-ride" on the IRS. That is, if the IRS is
 active in a state, then that state is less likely to run a tax amnesty
 program. Our estimates indicate that if the IRS audit rate had
 remained constant during the 1980-1988 period (instead of falling
 by almost one half), then the cumulative probability that an
 average state would have had a tax amnesty by 1988 would have
 fallen by just over 25 percent compared with its actual level.
 In Section II we review the relevant literature, concentrating
 on the characteristics of state tax amnesty participants and the
 perceived benefits of state tax amnesties to states. We next develop
 a discrete-time duration model of amnesties in Section III. In
 Section IV, drawing upon the discussion in Section II, we specify
 and estimate our duration model, and in Section V we discuss the
 results obtained from it. We conclude in Section VI with some brief
 speculations on the policy implications of our results.
 II. THE OBJECTIVES OF AMNESTIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
 AMNESTY PARTICIPANTS
 In the most comprehensive published review of state tax
 amnesty programs, Ross [1986] reports that "[m]ost state officials
 said that the primary goals of... amnesty programs were prospec-
 tive: to get taxpayers back on the tax rolls, and to improve future
 compliance," the latter in part by "publicizing] increased enforce-
 ment mechanisms that were to go into effect immediately after
 their amnesty periods." Leonard and Zeckhauser [1987] identify
 four benefits and three costs of tax amnesties. The benefits are (1)
 reduction in the guilt of evaders (assuming that guilt is a dead-
 weight loss); (2) increase in revenue from voluntary tax payments;
 (3) addition of former delinquents to the tax rolls; and (4)
 smoothing the transition to a regime of stricter tax law enforce-
 ment. The costs are (1) increased feelings by honest taxpayers that
 the tax system is unfair; (2) encouragement of future noncompli-
 3. Such an analysis is not only logically antecedent to the investigation of the
 consequences of running state tax amnesties, it is required of any such investiga-
 tion. This is because a proper empirical analysis of the gross revenue due and
 attributable to state amnesties must account for the self-selection of states in
 choosing to initiate an amnesty program. An analysis of the fiscal consequences of
 state tax amnesties is presented in Dubin and Wilde [1990].
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 ance (due to the anticipation of future amnesties) and (3) reduction
 in the sense that tax evasion is wrong.4
 These studies suggest that states have initiated tax amnesty
 programs to accomplish the dual goals of increasing revenues and
 decreasing noncompliance. In terms of specification of an empirical
 model, a desire for more revenue leads directly to the consideration
 of variables related to a state's fiscal "health" (e.g., state tax
 revenue), and to variables related to the potential yield from an
 amnesty (e.g., per capita income, unemployment, and, again, state
 tax revenue). The desire by states for decreased noncompliance
 merits some further discussion.
 There is a direct linkage between the activities of state and
 federal tax agencies. Congress and state legislatures have explicitly
 provided for exchanges of otherwise confidential tax return and
 other tax information between the states and the IRS "to increase
 tax revenues and taxpayer compliance and reduce duplicate re-
 source expenditures."5 Agreements on the exchange of tax informa-
 tion also explicitly provide that state tax enforcement agencies and
 the IRS "will develop cooperative return selection and examination
 programs" to avoid duplicative efforts.6 The IRS and cooperative
 states now routinely, for example, synchronize certain audit
 decisions.
 Many states, however, rely almost exclusively on the IRS for
 enforcement of state income taxes [Snavely, 1988; Dubin, Graetz,
 and Wilde, 1990a]. But IRS audit rates have fallen dramatically
 over the last decade from roughly 2 percent to under 1 percent
 [Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1990a]. This decline has had significant
 effects on many state tax enforcement programs. In terms of model
 specification the fall in federal audit rates coupled with the reliance
 of states on information provided by the IRS suggests the consider-
 ation of variables related to the IRS's enforcement activities within
 a state-in particular, the IRS audit rate.
 4. Alm and Beck [1986] analyze empirically the effects of various features of
 state tax amnesty programs on the direct revenue attributed to those programs,
 identifying the participation of known delinquents and greater funding for post-
 amnesty enforcement as the two key features. Leonard and Zeckhauser [1987] also
 consider the indirect consequences of tax amnesties in terms of the effects of such
 programs on revenue growth. However, while they find that states which had tax
 amnesties in 1983 and 1984 experienced greater revenue growth in subsequent
 years than states that did not, they do not control for any other factors besides the
 existence of an amnesty program.
 5. Internal Revenue Service Manual, Disclosure of Information Handbook,
 ?(33) 00.
 6. Id. at Exhibit (33) 00-1, Section 5.1 (Draft Agreement on Coordination of
 Tax Administration).
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 III. A DISCRETE-TIME DURATION MODEL
 In this section we describe the econometric approach that is
 used to estimate the length of time states wait before initiating a
 tax amnesty. The econometric model we employ is a discrete-time
 duration model with normally distributed hazards.
 In each period we classify the states according to their
 participation status: participating in a tax amnesty program or not
 yet participating. We specify the probability that a state which has
 not initiated an amnesty does initiate such a program conditional
 on its past experience, its economic characteristics, and other
 factors which may affect the attractiveness of amnesties.
 Let yit denote the participation status of state i in period t:
 J0 if not participating during period t;
 Yit | 1 if state initiates an amnesty during period t.
 The conditional probability that after t -1 periods of nonpar-
 ticipation the state begins an amnesty program in period t, termed
 the "escape probability," is given by
 Pit= Pr(yit = 1yvil = .Y.u. =yi,t- = 0Xidt)
 = ID(- 'Xid),
 where xit is a vector of characteristics thought to be related to the
 probability of initiating an amnesty and F(Q) denotes the cumula-
 tive normal distribution function. The probability that a state
 which has not initiated an amnesty up to period t fails to initiate an
 amnesty in that period is 1 - Pit.
 For each state we calculate the number of years that have
 transpired without any amnesty program and denote this by Ti.
 The waiting time Ti takes on a maximum value of nine years in our
 data, and we record any state that has waited longer than nine
 years as a "censored" observation.
 Let ci denote the state's status after Ti - 1 periods of
 nonparticipation:
 0 if state has an amnesty
 ci 1 if state does not have an amnesty.
 Observations for which ci = I are censored, as the observed
 duration Ti does not represent a completed spell. The treatment of
 censoring is of some importance in the modeling of amnesty
 decisions as fourteen of the 40 states that have nontrivial state
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 income taxes did not initiate an amnesty in the nine years for
 which we have data.7
 It follows that the conditional probability of observing a spell
 of length Ti which is either complete (ci = 0) or censored (c- = 1) is
 Ti-l
 (1) Li(Ti ci) = Pi T (1 - Pi,T)ci 171 (1-Ppi).
 From (1) we form the log-likelihood for the full sample: L =N
 logLi(Ti, ci). Maximizing L with respect to the unknown parameter
 y yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimates; optimiza-
 tion is undertaken using a Newton-Raphson algorithm with opti-
 mal step size.8 Once the parameters have been estimated, it is
 straightforward to obtain an estimate of the expected amount of
 time states will spend without participating in amnesty programs
 and the cumulative probability of initiating an amnesty as a
 function of the duration of time without an amnesty program.
 IV. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
 We begin with the specification of the escape probability. The
 escape probability is assumed to be a function of the unemploy-
 ment rate, personal income per capita, the percentage change in
 real income tax collections from the previous year and the rate of
 IRS auditing of individual tax returns. The unemployment rate
 and per capita income are related to both revenue and compliance,
 the percentage change in real income tax collection is related
 primarily to revenue, and the IRS audit rate is related primarily to
 compliance.
 The potential relationship between the unemployment rate
 and state income tax amnesties is complex. First, states with
 higher unemployment rates may have unsound economies, and
 thus an amnesty in such a state would produce less revenue.
 Second, as indicated in Section II above,- all amnesty programs
 include nonfilers, many exclusively so, and the number of nonfilers
 should increase as the unemployment rate rises. Third, if unemploy-
 ment is associated with the so-called "underground economy"
 7. We estimate our model for the years 1980-1988. North Carolina, in fact, ran
 a tax amnesty in 1989, and Virginia ran a tax amnesty in 1990, but we have not used
 this information since we lack the information on the necessary socioeconomic
 factors for 1989 and 1990.
 8. Estimation is performed within the Statistical Software Tools econometric
 package. See Dubin and Rivers [1988].
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 generally, then states with higher unemployment rates should
 have greater noncompliance problems. On net, since the presence
 of per capita income in our model should mitigate the first effect to
 some extent, we expect a positive relationship between the unem-
 ployment rate and the likelihood of an amnesty.
 Per capita income potentially has a complex relationship with
 state income tax amnesties because of (1) direct yield and fiscal
 stress effects (revenue-based motives for amnesties), (2) filing
 effects (taxpayers' minimum requirements for filing), and (3)
 compliance effects (increased opportunities to evade). All of these
 factors except the fiscal stress effect suggest a positive relationship
 between per capita income and the likelihood of an amnesty.
 The percentage change in state income tax collections provides
 an ideal test of the yield hypothesis versus the fiscal stress
 hypothesis; i.e., between the hypothesis that states with a solid
 revenue base are more likely to have an amnesty and the hypothe-
 sis that states experiencing fiscal stress are more likely to have an
 amnesty. A positive relationship between the percentage change in
 state income tax collections and the likelihood of an amnesty
 supports the yield hypothesis, while a negative relationship sup-
 ports the fiscal stress hypothesis.
 Finally, we include the federal audit rate of individual returns.
 On the one hand, states with higher federal audit rates might have
 compliance problems that are known to the IRS. This perception
 could lead a state to initiate its own amnesty program to combat
 the noncompliance. On the other hand, states where auditing is
 high benefit from the presence of the federal government with
 respect to their attempts to enforce tax compliance. Such states
 may view federal enforcement efforts as a cheap alternative to their
 own enforcement efforts and may thus eschew amnesty programs
 on the grounds that they are both costly and unnecessary.
 The role of audits raises special estimation issues. An unob-
 served effect such as greater noncompliance in a state may increase
 or decrease the state's propensity to initiate an amnesty program.
 Concurrently, greater noncompliance is likely to cause the IRS to
 increase its audit rate. To determine which effect (free-riding or
 directly combating noncompliance) dominates a state's decision to
 initiate an amnesty program requires that the simultaneous
 determination of audit rates and durations be explicitly recognized
 in the econometric analysis. In this regard, let
 (2) Y lit = 2it + xjlit41 + Flit
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 denote the latent variable for the escape event (initiate an amnesty)
 in period t for state i. This unobserved measure is a function of
 state-specific exogenous characteristics (xlit) and the potentially
 endogenous audit level (Y2it). As discussed above, we observe the
 discrete outcome ylit.
 The audit rate is specified by a reduced form,
 (3) Y 2it = X 2'it + V2it,
 2
 where x2it is a vector of state and time-varying characteristics that
 affect the level of auditing. The econometric difficulty is that the
 probit specification for the conditional escape probability resulting
 from equations (2) and (3) contains the potentially endogenous
 regressory 2it-
 While several solutions to this problem have been proposed
 (see Rivers and Vuong [1988] for a summary), we use the two-stage
 instrumental variables method (2SIV) due to Nelson and Olsen
 [1978]. Consistent estimates of the parameters 81 and 31 in the
 structural equation are obtained by replacing y 2it by its reduced-
 form predicted value y 2it = x 2I-f2. The probit escape probability is
 therefore specified as
 (4) Pit = ?(Y 2it8 + X'ltI1).
 As demonstrated by Newey [1987], the 2SIV procedures does not,
 in general, attain the Cramer-Rao lower bound that is achievable
 using limited information maximum likelihood methods, but it has
 the advantage of computational simplicity. To test for the endoge-
 neity of y '2it in the structural model, we calculate the asymptotic
 t-statistic for the coefficient of the reduced-form residual when it is
 added as an additional explanatory variable to equation (4) [Smith
 and Blundell, 1986].
 The reduced-form estimates for the audit equation are adapted
 from Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde [1990b]. In the present analysis we
 specify the individual audit rate to be a function of the exogenous
 variables from the duration model-the unemployment rate (UR),
 per capita income (INCOME), and the percentage change in real
 state tax revenue (PSTAX)-and three instrumental variables-
 IRS budgets per return filed (BPR), the number of non-W-2
 information returns filed per return (INFRATE), and the percent
 of the adult population over 65 years old (PER65). We estimate the
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 TABLE II
 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
 CONSTANT Constant term
 UR Unemployment ratea
 INCOME Personal income per capita in constant (1972) dollarsa
 PSTAX Percentage change in real state income tax collectionsb
 AUDIT Individual Audit Rate-number of individual returns examined
 divided by the number of individual returns filedc
 BPR Budget per return-IRS state level budget divided by the total
 number of returns filedc
 INFRATE Number of non-W-2 information returns program documents
 divided by the number of returns filedd
 PER65 Percentage of the adult population over 65 years of agea
 a. The unemployment rate, personal income, and the percentage of the adult population over 65 years of age
 are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1981-1989.
 b. Total state income taxes are taken from State Government Tax Collections, 1980-1988, published by the
 U. S. Department of Commerce. We divide this variable by total state income, taken from Statistical Abstracts of
 the U. S., 1981-1989, to obtain the average state income tax rate.
 c. Individual returns filed, individual returns examined, IRS state-level budgets, and total returns filed are
 taken from Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1980-1988. The audit rate excludes some
 audits conducted at the IRS Regional Service Centers amounting to approximately 1 to 2 percent of all
 individual examinations.
 d. Number of information returns were obtained directly from the Internal Revenue service for the years
 1977-1988.
 reduced form using GLS since we assume that the error term in the
 reduced-form equation contains a state-specific random effect.9
 The definitions and sources of the variables used in the
 reduced form as well as the duration model are given in Table II.
 We provide mean values of the variables for each of the nine years
 (1980-1988) for which we have data in Table III. Table III is based
 on a subset of the 40 states that have some significant state income
 tax program (as are the estimated duration models).
 V. RESULTS
 The duration models are based on 360 observations (40 states
 over nine years). We have calculated the length of time each state
 waits before it initiates an amnesty, and we record this length on
 both a fiscal and calendar year basis. Our working assumption is
 that durations are measured relative to 1980. We use 1980 as a
 9. We omit presentation or discussion of the estimated reduced form specifi-
 cally because it lacks a structural interpretation. We did perform Hausman-type
 specification tests using alternative reduced forms including that used by in Dubin,
 Graetz, and Wilde [1990b]. The estimated duration model and our conclusions
 regarding the endogeneity of the audit rate are generally robust to these alternative
 specifications.
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 TABLE III
 MEAN VALUES FOR VARIABLES IN REDUCED-FORM AUDIT EQUATION AND FOR
 VARIABLES IN DURATION MODELa
 Variableb 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
 UR 0.074 0.074 0.094 0.095 0.074 0.072 0.070 0.062 0.062
 INCOME 5.03 5.13 5.07 5.15 5.42 5.39 5.59 5.61 5.33
 PSTAX -0.0070 0.033 0.018 0.067 0.230 0.054 0.022 -0.044 -0.040
 AUDIT 1.59 1.48 1.34 1.29 1.15 1.09 0.92 0.84 0.78
 BPR 0.0042 0.0040 0.0040 0.0043 0.0043 0.0042 0.0040 0.0042 0.0046
 INFRATE 3.62 3.96 4.18 4.38 4.91 5.62 5.51 5.45 5.24
 PER65 0.156 0.157 0.159 0.160 0.162 0.164 0.165 0.167 0.167
 a. Based on a subset of 40 states that have a significant state tax program. States excluded are Alaska,
 Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
 b. UR and PER65 are percentages expressed in decimal form (i.e., 0.67 is 67 percent). PSTAX and AUDIT
 are percentages. INCOME and BPR are in thousands of 1972 dollars.
 starting point since the first state in our sample to conduct a tax
 amnesty was Illinois and this amnesty occurred in calendar year
 1981. We record this as a one-year duration event. 10
 The estimated duration models are presented in Table IV. The
 results are given for four models. The first two are based on
 calendar year lengths, and the second two are based on fiscal year
 lengths. Within each set we estimate first the model without
 correction for endogeneity of audits and second the endogeneity-
 corrected model.
 The audit rate effect is not significant in the models that are
 unadjusted for endogeneity (models 1 and 3). Since Hausman tests
 for endogeneity of the federal audit rate in models 1 and 3 yielded
 asymptotic t values of 1.92 and 1.11, respectively, we use the 2SIV
 procedures to correct for endogeneity. The consistent audit rate
 effect is then seen to be negative and significant (models 2 and 4).
 An increase in the audit rate leads states to wait longer before
 initiating a tax amnesty (the escape rate in any period declines) and
 thus the hypothesis of states free-riding is accepted-or at least
 dominates the behavior of the states vis-a-vis their own intentions
 regarding noncompliance.
 Given that the log-likelihoods in models 2 and 4 are similar, we
 do not discern any significant differences arising from the two
 methods of measuring the length of time elapsed before a state
 10. Both Illinois and Louisiana have each had two amnesties. Our duration
 model is based on the first amnesty for each state. We define the fiscal year to be
 October 1 to September 30, following the current federal practice.
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 TABLE IV
 DURATION MODEL FOR TIME WAITED BEFORE INITIATING AN AMNESTYa
 Fiscal
 year
 Calendar year duration duration
 Variable Model 1 Model 2b Model 3 Model 4b
 CONSTANT -3.52 -2.31 -3.289 -2.58
 (-3.08) (-1.80) (-2.87) (-2.00)
 UR 9.23 10.50 9.09 9.83
 (1.93) (2.14) (1.88) (1.99)
 INCOME 0.317 0.176 0.333 0.210
 (1.96) (0.998) (2.06) (1.20)
 PSTAX 0.964 1.092 0.832 0.924
 (1.82) (2.04) (1.87) (2.03)
 AUDIT -0.179 -0.677 -0.46 -0.564
 (-0.62) (-2.00) (-1.48) (-1.67)
 Log-likelihood -77.815 -75.960 -78.189 -77.956
 a. Based on a subset of 40 states that have a significant state tax program. States excluded are Alaska,
 Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
 t-statistics are in parentheses.
 b. Estimated using the (2SlV) method. The reduced form for the audit rate includes UR, INCOME, PSTAX,
 and the instrumental variables PER65, BPR, and INFRATE. See Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde [1990b] for details
 concerning specification and estimation of the reduced form.
 initiates an amnesty. In the discussion that follows, we use the
 calendar-based specification given in model 2 since it has the larger
 log-likelihood.
 The estimated effects in model 2 are generally in accord with
 our expectations. An increase in unemployment increases the
 likelihood of an amnesty as does an increase in per capita income
 (although the latter effect is not significant using the 2SIV
 estimates). The fiscal stress variable, PSTAX, which measures the
 percentage change in state tax revenue, has a coefficient that is
 significant and positive; states for which real state tax collections
 are increasing are more likely to initiate amnesties, thus support-
 ing the yield hypothesis as opposed to the fiscal stress hypothesis."
 11. As noted above, Leonard and Zeckhauser [1987] find some evidence that
 states which had amnesties in 1984 and 1985 experienced greater increases in
 revenue growth in subsequent years than states that did not. Leonard and
 Zeckhauser also observe that states which conducted amnesties in 1984 and 1985
 had lower growth rates in state revenue from 1980-1983 than states that did not.
 This latter observation seemingly is supportive of the fiscal stress hypothesis. Using
 the growth in real state income tax revenues, we found the same pattern as did
 Leonard and Zeckhauser. However, this pattern fails to hold for later amnesties. In
 fact, estimating the duration model over 1980-1988 using only PSTAX as an
 explanatory variable, provides weak evidence for the yield hypothesis and no
 evidence for the fiscal stress hypothesis.
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 Finally, we can illustrate the important role of audits in
 contributing to the states' rate of adoption of amnesty programs.
 We use the estimated duration model to calculate the cumulative
 adoption probabilities under an assumed course of events in which
 the IRS had not lowered the audit rate from its 1980 to 1988 levels.
 Using the 1980 levels of the audit rate shows that states would not
 have adopted amnesty programs with anywhere near the fervor we
 have witnessed. By the end of the sample period (1988), the
 cumulative adoption percentage would only be about 44 percent as
 compared with the actual value of approximately 60 percent. It
 would therefore appear that a side effect of the federal policy of
 diminished audit capability resulted in shifting a substantial
 enforcement burden onto the states, which then found it necessary
 to substitute their own efforts in place of the federal governments.
 VI. CONCLUSION
 While state tax amnesties may have resulted in increased rates
 of revenue growth for those states that ran them [Leonard and
 Zeckhauser, 1987], it is hard to escape the conclusion that many
 states initiated tax amnesties as part of a systematic effort to
 respond to the decade-long fall in federal tax enforcement activi-
 ties. Many, but not all, states coupled tax amnesties with increased
 post-amnesty enforcement efforts of their own. At the same time,
 there is no evidence that states that ran amnesty programs were
 under any "fiscal stress." Indeed, states with high per capita
 income and high growth rates in real state income tax collections
 were most likely to run tax amnesties, perhaps because an amnesty
 in such states was expected to generate higher yield.
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